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PERFECTING PUBLIC IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION: PRIVATE IMMIGRATION BILLS
AND DEPORTABLE LAWFUL
PERMANENT RESIDENTS
KATI L. GRIFFITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
My daughter Alejandra has lived in the United States since she was a
baby and loves this country. She made a mistake [referring to his
teenage daughter's arrest for helping a friend to cross the U.S.-Mexico
border illegally] but she is a good person and will make up for her
mistake. Right now, a private bill is our only hope to avoid our
daughter's deportation.
Antonio Arias Garcia
A private bill creates an exception to the public law for one individual or a
specified group of individuals. Described as "an anomaly" in our democratic
system, a private bill lacks the "generality of application" that is usually
associated with legislation.2 The individualistic nature of private bills has
inspired both criticism and praise. Critics argue that private bills raise equal
protection concerns because individuals in the same position may be treated
differently. 3 Some commentators praise private bills for creating "equitable
law" that addresses unique situations that cannot be covered equitably by the
* J.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Nancy
Morawetz for her invaluable feedback on multiple drafts of this article. Special thanks also to Leslie
Gates, Vanessa Martf, Daniel Seltz, Isaac Wheeler, Emily Willits, Professor Michael Wishnie and
Citizens and Immigrants for Equal Justice (CIEJ) for their extremely helpful input.
1. Telephone Interview with Antonio Arias Garcia (Feb. 12, 2003). Alejandra Arias Garcia's
private bill was introduced as H.R. 393, 108th Cong. (2003).
2. Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1684 (1966).
3- Id. at 1684-87; BERNADETTE MAGUIRE, IMMIGRATION: PUBLIC LEGISLATION AND PRIVATE BILLS
2 (1997). For other criticisms see Note, Private Bills and the Immigration Law, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1092 (1956). John Quincy Adams stated, "There ought to be no private bills before Congress .... A
deliberative assembly is the worst of all tribunals for the administration of justice." CHRISTINE P.
BENAGH, STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96th CONG., THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE
PATENT LEGISLATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 102 (Comm. Print 1979). Private bills may
violate the Naturalization Clause, which directs Congress to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See generally Iris Bennett. Note, The Unconstitutionality of
Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of "Aggravated Felony" Conviction, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696
(1999), Private bills are considered constitutional. See Plaut v- Spendthrift Farms, 514 US. 211,
239 n.9 (1995).
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general public law.4 As Professor Aleinikoff has stated, "[s]uch bills have
often been used to create humanitarian flexibility in a law that, if applied as
written, would produce harsh results."5 Private bills have also been praised
for "mak[ing] meaningful the right to petition."6 Historically, private bills
have been an especially important vehicle for politically marginalized
groups, such as immigrants, to petition the government for discretionary
relief.7 Immigrants, for instance, have become naturalized and have received
exclusion or deportation waivers through private bills.
By focusing on the fact that private bills are individual discretionary
exceptions to the law, many commentators have under-appreciated the
broader informational role of private bills.8 High numbers of private bills
have informed Congress about necessary changes to rigid or unintended
aspects of the public law. In this way, private immigration bills,9 for instance,
have served as "examples" that have "perfected the general law and carry out
the policy of reuniting families."' 0 High numbers of private bills inspired
public legislation that narrowed the categories of deportable immigrants and
increased the discretionary authority of the executive branch" to grant
waivers. ' 2 A Member of the Immigration Subcommittee stated that:
Private bills have over the course of the years demonstrated a need to
amend the general law. The committee has responded to the need and
legislation has been recommended to Congress. Examples of public
legislation enacted as a result of private bills have been waivers of the
4. Private Bills in Congress, supra note 2, at 1686 (stating that Congress "resembles an ancient
court of equity" when it enacts private laws). See United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440
(1896) (providing equitable rationale for Congressional power to enact private bills).
5. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 787
(4th ed. 1998).
6. Private Bills in Congress, supra note 2, at 1685; Robert Hooper & Juan P. Osuna, Remedies of
Last Resort: Private Bills and Deferred Action, IMMIGR. BRIEFING No. 97-6 (1997). The Petition
Clause of the U.S. Constitution has often been cited as authority for private bills. U.S. CONST. amend.
I (stating that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging ... the right of the people.., to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances).
7. See generally Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 667
(2003).
8. For a rare but thorough account of the informational role of private bills, see MAGUIRE, supra
note 3.
9. I will refer to "private immigration bills" as "private bills" throughout the remainder of the
text.
10. 115 CONG. REC. 6075 (1969) (statement of Rep. Feighan).
II The "executive branch" includes the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the
immigration judges that work under the Attorney General. An immigration court is a trial-level
tribunal that determines whether an immigrant is in the United States in violation of law, and, if so,
whether any waiver or benefit is available that would allow the immigrant to remain in the United
States lawfully. Decisions of Immigration Judges may be appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). Both the trial and appellate-level courts are components of the Department of Justice,
under the authority of the Attorney General.
12. 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 74.09[2] 74-157 (Matthew
Bender ed., 2000); see T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND
POLICY 669-70 (1991).
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grounds of excludability based upon tuberculosis, convictions of a
crime, mental retardation, misrepresentation, and the admission of
adopted children. 13
Private bills have increased historically, thereby intensifying their informa-
tional role, following the passage of highly restrictive immigration measures.
In the 1930s and in the 1950s, the number of private bills increased following
the expansion in the grounds for exclusion and deportation and the increase
in limitations on executive discretion. 14 For instance, as President Eisen-
hower noted, an "avalanche ... of private bills for the relief of aliens"
followed the restrictive measures and decreased executive discretion imple-
mented by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 (hereinafter
referred to as the "INA of 1952"). 15
This historical relationship between restrictive immigration law and high
numbers of private bills, however, did not continue following the 1996
immigration laws, often described as the most sweeping and restrictive
immigration laws since the INA of 1952. On April 24, 1996, Congress
amended the INA of 1952 through the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 16 and on September 30, 1996, Congress
enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "1996 immigration
laws"). 17 Many commentators have noted the extreme rigidity of these
laws. ' 8 "In truth, IIRIRA may be the harshest, most procrustean immigration
control measure in this century.... ."'9 Unlike the period of restrictive
immigration measures following the enactment of the INA in 1952, however,
private bills have not increased since 1996 for any of the categories of
immigrant groups (lawful permanent residents (LPRs), undocumented immi-
grants, etc.) that have been negatively affected by the 1996 imnmigration
laws.2"
This article examines why the historical relationship between immigration
law and private bills has not continued following the enactment of the 1996
13. 115 CONG. REC. 6075 (1969) (statement of Rep. Feighan).
14. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, Whom We Shall
Welcome 215 (1953) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]. See generally MAGUIRE, supra note 3.
15. H.R. Doc. No. 84-329, at 3 (1956) (statement of President Eisenhower).
16. Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) [hereinafter AEDPA].
17. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C., including titles 8, 18 and 28)
[hereinafter IIRIRA].
18. E.g., Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Law and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000).
19. Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of
Federalism, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 371 (1999).
20- The 1996 immigrant laws refer to deportation as "removal" and exclusion from entry as
"inadmissibility." I continue to use the terms deportation and exclusion throughout the text.
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immigration laws for any of the affected immigrant groups. 2 ' The article
focuses on LPRs with criminal convictions in particular because their
likelihood of deportation has increased dramatically as their access to
executive discretion to avoid deportation has decreased. Since 1996, even if
an LPR has lived in the United States since childhood, she can be subject to
mandatory deportation for almost any criminal conviction - including
misdemeanors, such as shoplifting or a bar fight. Since 1996, it is much more
likely that an LPR with only one conviction will be subject to deportation and
that someone subject to deportation pursuant to a criminal conviction will be
barred from access to executive discretion.22 Despite these increases in the
likelihood of deportability and severe restrictions in executive discretion,
only one person with a criminal conviction has benefited from a private bill
since 1996.23
Such interruption in this historical relationship has resulted in two negative
effects. First, family members of deportable LPRs have suffered gravely
from the greater likelihood of deportation and virtual non-existence of
discretionary relief from any branch of government. As the Supreme Court
has stated, "deportation is a drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives and
disrupt families. 24 Since the enactment of the 1996 immigration laws,
thousands of United States citizens and lawful permanent resident family
members have suffered emotionally and economically due to indefinite
separation from their loved ones. 25 Second, the interruption in the historical
relationship has also hindered private bills from informing members of
Congress about the inadequacies and/or overly harsh aspects of the 1996
immigration laws. In this way, immigrants have reduced access to one of
their rare opportunities to participate in the political process and to shape the
laws that govem their lives and families.
In Section I1, I will analyze the relationship between immigration law and
private bills as well as the informational role of private bills prior to the
enactment of the 1996 immigration laws. As I will illustrate below, pre-1996,
the rise in private bills informed public immigration law, often resulting in
21. It is fairly well settled that lawful permanent residents are protected by the First Amendment
and therefore have the right to petition. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Judge
Murphy stated in his separate opinion, "Once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he
becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders.");
Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 310 n.5 (1970) (adopting Murphy concurrence in
Bridges); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 n.5 (1953) (adopting Murphy concurrence
in Bridges).
22. Morawetz, supra note 18, at 1936-37.
23. See Priv. L. No. 105-6, 112 Stat. 3666 (1998); H.R. REP. No. 105-644 (1998)-
24. Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963). See Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10
(1948) (calling deportation "a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile");
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that deportation may deprive an individual
"of all that makes life worth living"); Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Deportation
is not, of course, a penal sanction. But in severity it surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal
penalties.").
25. Morawetz, supro note 18, at 1937-38, 1950.
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decreases in the grounds for exclusion and deportation and increases in
access to discretionary relief through the executive branch. Because deporta-
tion of LPRs with criminal convictions was much less likely before 1996, the
analysis draws from the experience of other immigrant groups in both the
deportation and exclusion contexts. Section III will focus particularly on
LPRs with criminal convictions to explore the relationship between inmigra-
tion laws and private bills after the 1996 legal changes. It will illustrate that
the introduction of unprecedented restrictive immigration measures in 1996
was not followed by a period of increased private bills. Section IV will
explain the reasons for the interruption in the historical relationship and will
try to identify what is hindering private bills from fulfilling their historical
role. Section V will conclude and suggest some recommendations that may
enable private bills to restore their historical discretionary and informative
role during times of restrictive immigration policy.
1I. IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRIVATE BILLS: THE RELATIONSHIP PRE-1996
This section will examine the relationship between immigration law and
private bills from the early days of the twentieth century until the passage of
the 1996 immigration laws. It will illustrate that legislative discretion
through private bills often increased following the passage of restrictive
immigration legislation. In turn, it will illustrate that decreases in the
numbers of private bills followed the relaxation of restrictive immigration
legislation, such as the expansion of executive discretionary relief from
deportation and exclusion from entry. Where appropriate, the section will
highlight the informational role of private bills.
A. The First Half of the Twentieth Century
1. The Immigration Act of 1917 and Private Bills
Although legislation mandating the exclusion from entry of certain immi-
grants with criminal convictions was established in the late nineteenth
26 otni10century, it was not until 1917 that Congress enacted legislation mandating
deportation of immigrants convicted of crimes in the United States after
proper entry.27 Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1917 "in large
measure because World War I brought nervousness about the loyalty and
26. As a response to concerns regarding the importation of Chinese prostitutes and European
criminals, Congress, through the Immigration Act of 1875, excluded from entry immigrants that had
served sentences for convictions of felonious crimes in their own country. The Immigration Act of
1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875); see E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1964 at 80 (1981).
27. See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub- L. No. 301, ch. 19, 39 Stat 874 (1917); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 990 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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assimilability of the foreign born to a fever pitch."'a The Immigration Act of
1917 and subsequent immigration legislation, such as the Quota Act of 1921
and the Immigration Act of 1924, imposed harsh immigration restrictions
such as literacy requirements, economic self-sufficiency requirements and
the establishment of a racially-based quota system for admitting immi-
grants.29
Congress, however, did not explicitly grant the executive branch the
ability to provide discretionary relief to immigrants in deportation proceed-
ings until 1940.30 In the context of restrictive immigration measures and
limited executive discretion before 1940,3 1 private bills played a primary role
in the provision of discretionary relief from deportation for individuals.32
The high number of private bills played a broader informational role as well.
2. The Informational Role of Increased Private Bills: The Alien
Registration Act of 1940
In the 1930's private bills informed Congress about the need for the
executive branch to have greater latitude to provide discretionary relief from
deportation.3 3 Despite initial hesitations,3 4 a high number of private bill
requests in the 1930's originally prompted Congress to delegate power over
28. U.S. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, STAFF REPORT ON U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 182-84, 189 (1981).
29. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139 ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153; Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L.
No. 5, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5.
30. Even before 1940 federal circuit courts were periodically throwing out some "obviously
grotesque" cases. Mae Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and
Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REv. 69, 95 (2003).
31. The executive branch, however, did have some very limited executive discretion before 1940
through the Seventh Proviso of the Immigration Act of 1917. The Seventh Proviso provided that
"aliens returning after a temporary absence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven
consecutive years may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General and under such
conditions as he may prescribe." Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 156 (1917)) (repealed 1952). Even though the Seventh Proviso
applied literally only to exclusion proceedings, and the deportation provisions of the statute did not
have a similar provision, the executive branch increasingly used it to grant relief in deportation
proceedings following the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
(2001) (citing Matter of L, 1 1. & N. Dec. 1, 2, 1940 WL 7544 (1940) and stating that the exercise of
discretion was deemed a nunc pro tunc correction of the record of reentry). Roosevelt's Secretary of
Labor, Frances Perkins, a New York Progressive-era reformer, and the new head of the INS, Daniel
MacCormack, were not able to pass legislation but creatively interpreted the Seventh Proviso to
suspend deportations and to legalize the status of certain illegal immigrants in hardship cases. Ngai,
supra note 30, at 100. The secretary of labor granted the immigrant a waiver from deportation and
allowed her to depart to Canada and to reenter the U.S. as a legal permanent resident. In approving of
this construction of the Seventh Proviso, the Attorney General stated that strictly limiting the
exception to exclusion proceedings would be "capricious and whimsical." Matter of L, 1 I. & N. Dec.
1, 5, 1940 WL 7544 (1940).
32. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 991 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting); INS v. Wang, 450 US. 139, 140, n.] (1981); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 222
(1963).
33. Historical evidence suggests that private bills played an informational role with respect to
immigration legislation passed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as well. See Wishnie, supra
note 7, at 710-11.
34. See 81 CONG. REC. 5548-49 (1937) (remarks of Reps. Fish & Robinson).
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deportation relief to the executive branch in 1940.3s Members of Congress
felt that they should delegate some of the responsibility over deportation
waivers in order to relieve the burden caused by high numbers of private bill
requests. In the debate on a 1937 bill, Representative Dies stated:
It was my original thought that the way to handle all these meritori-
ous cases was through special [private] bills. I am absolutely convinced
as a result of what has occurred in this House that it is impossible to
deal with the situation through private bills.
36
In INS v. Chadha the Supreme Court noted that:
After long experience with the clumsy, time-consuming private bill
procedure for making decisions on allowing deportable aliens to remain
in the United States, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to
the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the
authority to make such decisions.
The Alien Registration Act of 1940 provided the executive branch with
discretion to grant deportation relief to individuals in cases where the
equities, or concern with fairness, weighed in the immigrant's favor.38 The
Act authorized the Attorney General to suspend an immigrant's deportation if
the immigrant could prove five years of residence in the United States and
good moral character. An individual also had to prove that deportation would
result in "serious economic detriment" to a spouse, parent, or minor child
who was an LPR or a United States citizen. 39 "Good moral character" did not
preclude people with criminal records. Instead it referred to a "reputation
which [would] pass muster with the average man need not rise above the
level of the common mass of people."4° In 1948, Congress extended the
35. Many felt that the private bill system became unmanageable as the number of hardship cases
rose, necessitating the congressional delegation of its suspension-of-deportation power to the
executive branch. See 81 CONG REC. 5542 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Dies); GORDON ET AL., supra note
12, at § 74.07[2][a] 74-68 ("Confronted with large numbers of compassionate cases, the administra-
tive authorities requested that Congress grant authority to remit deportation."); Susan L. Kamlet,
Comment, Judicial Review of "Extreme Hardship" in Suspension of Deportation Cases, 34 AM. U. L.
REV. 175, 175 n.4 (1984) ("In 1936 the Commissioner of Immigration cited nearly 3,000 cases under
consideration which involved 'such incredibly cruel family separations ... so repugnant to every
American principle of justice and humanity that deportation was stayed until Congress might take
some action.' ").
36. 81 CONG. REC. 5542 (1937). Representative Dies' bill passed the House but did not come to a
vote in the Senate- INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S 919, 933 (1983).
37. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954 (declaring unconstitutional the statutory provision that allowed
Congress to have a one-house veto over executive branch decisions to grant deportation waivers).
38. Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670, 672; see INS v. Wang, 450
U.S. 139, 140(1981).
39. Alien Registration Act § 20, 54 Stat. at 672; see INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 190 (1984);
INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 140 (1981); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 223 (1963).
40. Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670; see S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 596 (1950) (discussing "good
moral character" in suspension of deportation cases).
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executive branch's ability to suspend deportation to immigrants without
family ties who could establish seven years of residence in the United
States. 4 1 Despite calls for even further loosening of restrictive immigration
legislation through expanded executive discretion,42 the early 1950's wit-
nessed an intensification of legal restrictions on immigration.
B. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Private Bills
1. Restrictive Immigration Laws and Increases in Private Bills
Amidst fears of Communist infiltration, U.S. legislators passed public
immigration legislation that severely tightened U.S. borders vis-A-vis immi-
grants over President Truman's veto.43 The INA of 1952 was an unprec-
edented re-codification and revision of existing immigration law.4 It not
only broadened the criteria for what made someone deportable or excludable
but it also decreased access to executive discretion.45 In the wake of this
severe increase in restrictive immigration measures, private bills skyrocketed
in the 1950s.
In the early 1950s, some Members of Congress felt that too many
immigrants were benefiting from the executive branch's suspension of
deportation under the Alien Registration Act of 1940.46 Congress signifi-
cantly expanded the crimes and misdemeanors that made an immigrant
excludable from entry and deportable.47 In 1952, INA § 244(a) decreased
executive discretion over deportation. 48 Congress mandated that the execu-
tive branch could only grant relief to immigrants in circumstances where an
41. See Act of July 1, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-863, 62 Stat. 1206. There was some resistance to this
delegation of discretion as well. See S. REP. No. 80-1204 (1948) (stating that Congress should not
"relinquish its prerogatives" to pass upon suspension of deportation cases).
42. In the late forties the executive branch called for a greater increase in executive discretion to
deal with deportation cases that were being handled through private bills. In 1947 House Judiciary
Committee hearings on legislation allowing waivers for minor excludable offenses, Attorney General
Tom Clark, for instance, emphasized the need for additional executive discretionary authority to
cover the types of cases represented by private bills. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 80TH CONG.,
REGULATING POWERS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 132 (Comm. Print 1947); see S. REP. No. 81-1515, at
609-10 (1950) (indicating the existence of a need for extended executive discretion through the
creation of an administrative procedure to correct errors in alien admission).
43. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY U.S. SENATE, 96TH CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY:
1952-1979 1 (Comm. Print 1979).
44. See id. at 5.
45. The 1952 Act rendered excludable immigrants with criminal records, narcotic violators and
addicts, people engaging in "immoral sexual acts," and smugglers. Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered statutes at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1189).
46. William C.B. Underwood, Note, Unrenewable Discretionary Justice: The New Extreme
Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. L.J. 885, 889 (1997) (citing S. REP. No.
81-1515, at 600-01 (1950) and S. REP. No. 82-1137, at 25 (1952)).
47. See generally HUTCHINSON, supra note 26.
48. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 190-92 (1984).
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immigrant's deportation would be "unconscionable. 4 9 INA § 244 restricted
the Attorney General's ability to grant suspensions of deportation to cases
that would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" for the
immigrant or the immigrant's family. 50 To determine whether "exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship" existed, the court evaluated factors such as
the length of residency in the United States, the manner of entry, family ties,
the possibility of obtaining a visa abroad, the age and health of the immigrant
and the financial burden involved.5 ' Some, but not all, of these factors had to
be present to grant a suspension of deportation.52 The 1952 provision also
required an immigrant to show "good moral character" and a certain
continuous period of residency depending on the seriousness of the deporta-
tion grounds. 3 The period of residency was seven years for lower level
crimes and ten years for more serious crimes.54
The restrictive immigration measures, however, were followed by a
historic increase in private bills in the 1950s. As Figure 1 illustrates, the
number of private bills soared after the enactment of the INA in 1952.
Congress granted seven hundred private bills between 1953 and 1958 as
waivers for exclusion and deportation based on criminal offenses.5 5
49. See S. REP. No. 82-1137, at 25 (1952) (stating that "to justify the suspension of deportation
the hardship must not only be unusual but must also be exceptionally and extremely unusual").
50. See INA § 244(a); INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 140 (1981).
51. See In re S., 5 . & N. Dec. 409, 410-11 (B.I.A. 1953); In re U., 51. & N. Dec. 413, 414
(B.I.A. 1953).
52. See In re S., 5 1. & N. Dec. 409, 410 (B.I.A. 1953).
53. See INA § 244(a). The 1952 Act outlined that the following individuals could not be found to
be a person of good moral character: a habitual drunkard, an adulterer, one whose income is derived
principally from illegal gambling, one who has been convicted of two or more gambling offenses, one
who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining benefits under the INA of 1952, one who
has served a period of 180 days or more in prison, or one who at any time has been convicted of the
crime of murder. INA § 101(f). INA §101(f) also stated that individuals convicted under certain
sections of INA § 212(a) would also bc considered not to have good moral character. The sections
related to individuals with two or more convictions, polygamists, prostitutes, individuals convicted of
any law or regulation related to illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, individuals who had assisted illegal
entry for monetary gain and individuals convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude is not defined in the INA of 1952, but most courts evaluate whether a crime involves moral
turpitude on whether the inherent nature of the act includes elements that demonstrate the
perpetrator's "baseness, vileness and depravity." Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433, 435-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). See Lawyers' Coop. Publ'g Co. & Bancroft-Whitney Co., Annotation, What
Constitutes "Crime Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning of §§ 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar Predecessor
Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. FED.
480 (2000) (describing crimes involving moral turpitude as including homicide, manslaughter,
assault, robbery, burglary, embezzlement, extortion, bigamy, incest, indecent assault, and rape).
54. Individuals who were deportable under INA § 241(a) were subject to the ten-year require-
ment. These individuals included those who entered the U.S. without inspection, those convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry and sentenced or confined for
a year or more, those who are convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct. INA § 241(a).
55. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 148.
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Figure 1. # of private bills enacted waiving exclusion/deportation based on
criminal convictions.
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2. The Informational Role of Increased Private Bills: 1954 Act, 1957 Act,
1962 Reforms and the 1981 Drug Laws
In the years following the INA of 1952, private bills helped to fine tune
what some criticized as a poorly drafted and confusing immigration law, 56 as
they educated members of Congress about the unintended consequences and
problems with the existing immigration law. Private bills helped Congress
figure out where it was necessary to "tinker[] with the machinery" of the INA
of 1952.57 The tremendous increase in private bills in the 1950s compelled
Congress to enact legislation, most notably through the Act of 1954, the Act
of 1957 and the reform of INA § 244 in 1962. Furthermore, after the early
1960s, when executive discretion was generally expanding, and legislative
discretion through private bills was generally retracting, private bills played
an informational role in relation to the 1981 drug laws, which were inspired
by a small, but relative, increase in private bills.
a. Act of 1954
Immediately after the enactment of the INA of 1952, a series of private
bills exempted immigrants with petty criminal offenses from the strict
56. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 14, at 263 (stating that the INA of 1952 was criticized for
being poorly drafted and confusing).
57. See generally COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY U.S. SENATE, supra note 43, at 52 (borrowing phrase
from Elmer Fried, Immigration and Nationality Law, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 188 (1960)).
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provisions of the general law set out in the INA of 1952.58 In 1954, as a
response to a rising tide of private bills, Congress created an exemption from
exclusion for immigrants "whose only bar to entry was commission of a petty
offense. ' 59 House debate on the 1954 amendments shows the direct connec-
tion between private bills and the enactment of public legislation. The
Chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee, Mr. Walter, stated in the House
debate:
[I]t has become apparent to the Committee on the Judiciary that
American consular officers are excluding entirely too many aliens on
very technical grounds. Case after case has been brought before us
under private legislation, in which visas are being denied to persons
who committed such petty crime as theft of bread during the famine
days of 1946 Germany ....
b. Act of 1957
A dramatic increase in private bills also inspired the enactment of
public immigration legislation in 1957. As a response to private bills,
legislation in 1957 granted discretionary authority to the Attorney Gen-
eral to waive exclusion and deportation based on crimes involving moral
turpitude, fraud, and prostitution in cases of family reunification. 61 "In
enacting the waivers for minor criminal offenses, Senator Arthur V.
Watkins (R-UT) noted during debate on the legislation that many of the
cases had previously been the subject of a great deal of private legislation
to accommodate the separation of families. 62 The House Judiciary
Committee noted the connection between private bills and legislative
reform in its report on the legislation:
The Committees on the Judiciary of the House and the Senate have a
considerable number of private bills before them under which the
conduct of such aliens, considering their family situation, would be
condoned. A great number of such private bills passed the Congress and
were enacted into law during the last few years. It appears to the
committee that it is unfair and improper to extend the benefit of
legislative relief solely on a few selected individuals who are in a
position to reach the Congress for redress of their grievances. It is felt
58. Many of these private bills were for alien wives of American servicemen who had been
convicted of minor offenses during the post-war period. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 5, at
787-88; MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 150.
59. Act of September 3, 1954, 68 Stat. 1145; MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 146.
60. 100 CONG. REC. 15,490-91 (1954).
61. Act of Sept. I1, 1957, 71 Stat. 639; MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 153. This statute was a
predecessor statute to INA § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f). Chow v- INS, 641 F.2d 1384, 1388 (1981).
62. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 153; 103 CONG. REC. 15,492 (1957).
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that that humanitarian approach should be extended to an entire defined
class of aliens rather than to selected individuals.
63
c. 1962 Reforms
Historical evidence suggests that high numbers of private bills in the 1950s
played an informational role in the 1962 reforms to the INA of 1952 that lead
to increased executive discretion. A 1953 independent commission that
Congress requested to review the immigration laws commented, "The
increase in the number of private immigration bills introduced into, and
passed, by the Congress is itself evidence that something is wrong with our
immigration laws .... "'
In 1956, President Eisenhower recommended a reform of the INA of 1952
to "provide a fair and workable substitute for the private bill system of
granting relief from deportation in hardship cases."'65 Some thought that the
increase in the number of private bills was not a sufficient solution to the
strict "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard for executive
branch discretion provided in INA § 244. The INA of 1952 was widely
criticized for its lack of executive discretion and its rigid "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" standard.66 Some felt that the Attorney General
should have been granted more discretion than allowed for by § 244 of the
INA of 1952.67 President Truman, in his veto of the INA of 1952, expressed
fear that INA § 244 "would narrow the circle of those who can obtain
relief.... ." Section 244, Truman felt, would be an unfortunate reduction in
executive discretion because other sections of the INA of 1952 would impose
63. H.R. REP. No. 85-1199, at 11 (1957). The Act of September 26, 1961 incorporated this and
other ameliorative legislation as INA § 212(h).
64. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 14, at 216.
65. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY U.S. SENATE, supra note 43, at 16-17.
66. See Jonathon P. Foerstel, Comment, Suspension of Deportation Toward a New Hardship
Standard, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 663, 667 n.31 (1981). In a letter to Senator Arthur Watkins, President
Eisenhower stated that there would be problems interpreting the exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship standard, and therefore, "the laws should more clearly state the standards upon which this
discretionary relief may be granted by the Attorney General." 99 CONG. REC. 4321 (1953). One of the
harshest criticisms of the "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship standard came from Ben
Touster, President of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigration Aid Society:
[S]ection 244 [along with §§ 212(c), 245] ... rob our immigration laws of every vestige of
humaneness which has developed since 1917. The hardship attendant upon separating families
is not enough to grant suspension .... One must measure degrees of suffering and torture, and
only those who suffer the anxiety of mental and physical pain to the utmost may be relieved
under this law. The rest must suffer exile, a dreadful punishment abandoned by the common
consent of all civilized peoples.
(quoting STAFF OF PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, 82D. CONG., HEARINGS
BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 1789 (Comm. Print 1952))
(alterations in original).
67. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 14, at 214 ("The exercise of discretion according to
standards fixed by Congress is peculiarly an executive function. The legislature is not equipped, and
not intended to be equipped, to handle the details of administration ... ").
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even harsher restrictions and would add to the number deserving relief.
6 8
In 1962, INA § 244(a)(1) was amended, reducing the hardship requirement
to an "extreme hardship" standard instead of "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship" for an immigrant deportable on any other grounds except
serious criminal convictions. 69 The "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" requirement was maintained for LPRs with serious criminal
convictions. 70 The main difference was that the Attorney General could
suspend a deportation if she found that deportation would result in extreme
hardship for the immigrant or her family.7" The other requirements remained
the same. The immigrant had to have "good moral character" and seven years
of physical presence in the United States. Immigrants who were deportable
on the basis of convictions of more serious crimes had to establish ten years
of residence and show that their deportation would result in "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" before the Attorney General would grant
suspension of deportation. 2
d. The Drug Laws of 1981
Amidst a general decline in private bill numbers, private bills granting
waivers for drug crimes increased during the 94th and 95th Congresses
(1975-1978). Following this increase, Congress introduced public legislation
in 198 1.7 3 The public legislation provided a discretionary waiver of the
narcotics exclusion for a single offense of thirty grams or less of simple
possession of marijuana if the waiver was on behalf of the spouse, child or
parent of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.74 A limited waiver was
provided in cases of extreme hardship.
There were twenty-nine private bills waiving exclusions and deportations
for drug offenses leading up to the legislative change. The passage of
twenty-nine private bills represented a significant increase in light of the
general reduction in the passage of private bills since 1962. The House
Judiciary Committee report on the legislation stated that private bills played
an informational role in its decision to pass the general legislation:
The private bills have demonstrated to the Committee that this
ground of exclusion has resulted in undue hardship to many U.S.
68. H.R. Doc. No. 82-520, at 7 (1952).
69. See Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247-48. LPRs deportable under
INA § 244(a)(2) did not benefit from this relief. For a discussion of what constitutes serious criminal
convictions see supra note 54.
70. This referred to crimes that fell under INA § 244(a)(2) or under certain subsections of INA
§ 241(a).
71. INA § 244, 66 Stat. 214 (amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1962)); INS v. Wang, 450 U.S.
139, 139 40 (1981).
72. INA § 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1976).
73. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 149.
74. Act of December 29, 1981, 95 Stat. 1611.
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citizens... [I]n the past 10 years the Committee has approved 34
private bills for spouses or children of U.S. citizens who had been
convicted of a minor drug violation and had since demonstrated their
rehabilitation.75
The enactment of the 1954 Act, the 1957 Act, the 1962 reforms and the
1981 drug laws illustrate that private bills not only have a discretionary
impact on individuals but also have a broader informational role that often
leads to legislative reform.
C. The Expansion of Executive Discretion and the Decrease in Private
Bills: 1962-1996
In contrast to increases in private bills following restrictive immigration
measures, private bills tended to decrease after the loosening of restrictive
immigration laws. 6 This section will illustrate the more general trend that as
executive discretion to grant deportation waivers increased in the 1960s,
1970s and 1980s legislative discretion via private bills decreased.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of private bills remained low after an
increase in executive discretion over deportation in the early 1960's. In 1962,
the executive branch was allowed to grant waivers when there was evidence
of "extreme hardship" as opposed to limiting itself to situations involving
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." The distinction between
"extreme hardship" and "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" has
never been clearly defined, but it is generally agreed that, in 1962, Congress
intended to lessen the degree of hardship required for the Attorney General to
suspend deportation.77 Even though there is no explicit evidence that the
1962 delegation of executive discretion was directly inspired by private bills,
the reduction in private bills suggests that increased executive discretion
reduced Congressional incentives to pass private bills on behalf of immi-
grants excludable or deportable due to criminal offenses.
The use of private bills remained low as executive branch discretion
expanded further in the 1970s.7 8 Individuals returning to a lawful unrelin-
75. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 154 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-264, at 12 (1981)).
76. Immediately following the delegation of executive discretion with the Act of 1957, for
instance, the numbers of private hills decreased significantly. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 148. Private
law waivers for fraud decreased from seventy-three in the 84th Congress (1955-1956) to thirty-nine
in the 85th Congress (1957-1958) and to eight in the 86th Congress (1959-1960). In 1961, the
criminal waivers' mechanisms became permanent. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 153.
77. In re Hwang, 10 I. & N. Dec. 448, 452 (1964); In re Louie, 10 I. & N. Dec. 223, 225 (1963);
see Wang. v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1345 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
78. 66 Stat. 187, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. 1953). The 1952 INA § 212(c) provision was facially
limited to exclusion (inadmissibility) proceedings but was significantly extended to cover the
deportation context over time. See, e.g., Atwood v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 1, 2 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001);
Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 1998); Barreiro v. INS, 989 F.2d 62, 63 (1st Cir. 1993);
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Smith, 11 1. & N. Dec. 325 (1965); Matter of
G. A., 7 1. & N. Dec. 274 (1956).
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quished domicile of seven consecutive years qualified for a discretionary
hearing for a waiver under INA § 212(c).79 In 1976, executive discretion
through INA § 212(c) became available to a much larger number of LPRs
with criminal convictions. Before 1976, there had been some dispute about
whether INA § 212(c) covered the deportation context, thereby reducing
access to the remedy.
The 1952 INA § 212(c) provision was facially limited to exclusion from
entry proceedings. Over time INA § 212(c) was extended to cover the
deportation context."0 A temporary absence from the United States was
interpreted to grant individuals with the opportunity for INA § 212(c) relief.
In 1956 the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that the respondent was
eligible for INA § 212(c) consideration by reason of a temporary absence
from the United States in 1952.8' The Board reasoned that since the
respondent would have been eligible for INA § 212(c) relief at the time that
he reentered the country, relief could be granted at this later juncture. Section
212(c) was also extended to deportation proceedings where an LPR re-
quested an adjustment of status.8 2 The Board stated that since the adjustment
of status application subjected the immigrant to all bases for exclusion, there
was "no valid reason for denying him the benefits of INA § 212(c) on the
technical ground that he is not returning to the United States after a voluntary
departure. ' 83
It was not until 1976, however, that the Second Circuit affirmatively held
in Francis v. INS that INA § 212(c) relief was available in deportation
proceedings. 84 "The INS has adopted Francis nationwide so that all eligible
permanent resident aliens who are ordered deported may ask the Attorney
General to waive the ground for deportability under INA § 212(c).' 85 From
1976 until 1996, § 212(c) provided administrative relief for LPRs who were
inadmissible or deportable for committing criminal offenses.8 6 Between
79. 66 Stat. 187,8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. 1953).
80. Blurring the line between exclusion (at entry) and deportation (once admitted) is a common
theme in U.S. immigration history, During the 1920s, Congress and the Immigration Service
conceived of and executed deportation as an adjunct to the exclusion process. The Immigration
Service blurred the lines between "excludability" and "deportability" by deporting immigrants who
committed minor crimes or violated norms of sexual morality even though they were not deportable
offenses. The Service did this by considering these people likely to become liable for a public charge
at time of entry (LPC). The Service, in other words, "considered lapses or misfortune subsequent to
entry to be the teleological outcome of a prior condition, which it adduced by way of retroactive
judgment." Courts clarified somewhat in the 1930s that conviction of a crime "before entry" referred
to crimes committed outside the United States before the immigrant's first entry. Ngai, supra note 30,
at 96.
81. Matter of G. A., 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956).
82. Matter of Smith, 1 I. & N. Dec. 325 (1965) (citing INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1964)).
83. ld. at 327.
84. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
85. Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d 1362, 1364 (7th Cir. 1987).
86. See Barreiro v. INS, 989 E2d 62, 63 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that, while the statutory language
specified aliens attempting to reenter the country, it uniformly interpreted former INA § 212(c) to
give aliens in deportation proceedings, as well as exclusion proceedings, the right to apply for a
2004]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
1989 and 1994 over half of all immigrants who petitioned for INA § 212(c)
relief demonstrated sufficient equities to receive discretionary relief from
deportation.87
This provision increased executive discretion significantly. It gave an
immigration judge an opportunity to consider issues such as rehabilitation,
harm to family members and whether the individual had strong ties to his or
her country of origin.88 If this balance of equities tipped in favor of the LPR,
the immigration judge could grant relief from deportation. 89 The hearings
evaluated the fundamental fairness of deporting a particular LPR. A careful
consideration of the factors allowed immigration judges to weigh the LPR's
overall value to her family and community against any potential danger
posed to society. For instance:
The Immigration Judge's decision to grant the waiver depend[ed] on
the weighing of many factors [including] family ties within the United
States, residence of long duration in this country[,] ... evidence of
hardship to the individual and family if deportation were to occur,
service in this country's armed forces, a history of employment,
existence of property or business ties, evidence of value and service to
the community, proof of rehabilitation, and other evidence attesting to
an individual's good character and likelihood of future positive contri-
butions to American society.90
In this atmosphere of expanded executive discretion, the number of private
bills remained low.
III. IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRIVATE BILLS: THE RELATIONSHIP POST-1996
This section will examine the relationship between immigration law and
private bills since 1996. The 1996 immigration laws created the most
sweeping changes in immigration law since the enactment of the INA in
1952. 9 ' In many ways, the 1996 immigration laws are even more restrictive
than the INA of 1952 as they expanded grounds for deportation and
eliminated almost all forms of executive discretionary relief from deporta-
tion. Unlike the period following the enactment of the INA of 1952, however,
discretionary waiver); Atwood v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 1, 2 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001); Goncalves v. Reno, 144
F3d 110, 114 (lst Cir. 1998).
87. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 178 (E.D.N.Y 1997).
88. Morawetz, supra note 18, at 1939.
89. See Matter ofMarin, 16 1. &N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978); Morawetz, supra note 18, at 1939.
90. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); see In re C-V-T, Int. Dec. No. 3342,
1998 WL 151434 (B.I.A 1998); Matter of Marin, 16 1. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978).
91. Nathan Gordon & Louis Gordon, Discretionary Relief from Deportation Curtailed, L.A.
LAWYER, Mar. 2002, at 53; Alexander E. Chopin, Disappearing Due Process: The Case for
Indefinitely Detained Permanent Residents'Retention of Their Constitutional Entitlement Following
a Deportation Order, 49 EMORY L. J. 1261, 1276 (2000); see Sabino v. Reno, 8 F. Supp. 2d 622, 623
(S.D. Tex. 1998).
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the restrictive 1996 immigration laws have not been coupled with an
"avalanche" of private bills. Instead, private bills have continued to decline.
A. The Intensification of Restrictive Immigration Measures
Before 1996, far fewer LPRs with criminal convictions were "deportable"
under the immigration laws. Furthermore, when an LPR was rendered to be
deportable, the pre-1996 immigration laws gave the individual an opportu-
nity to demonstrate to an immigration judge why she deserved to remain in
the U.S. LPRs could present equities weighing in their favor, such as
evidence of rehabilitation, extensive family ties in the U.S. and productive
participation in the community. Upon hearing about the equities in favor of
an LPR and the counter arguments, an immigration judge had the discretion
to waive deportation in cases where the LPR's equities significantly out-
weighed any potential danger to society. When there was a non-frivolous
legal basis to do so, LPRs had the right to appeal an immigration judge's
unfavorable decision in a federal court. Since the 1996 immigration laws,
however LPRs with criminal convictions are much more likely to be
rendered deportable and to be barred from presenting the equities of their
case in executive or judicial hearings, even in the most sympathetic of cases.
1. Expansion ofAggravated Felonies Definition and Increased Grounds
for Deportability
Immigration measures became more restrictive after 1996, dramatically
increasing the grounds for deportability. In 1996, Congress significantly
expanded the crimes and misdemeanors that make an LPR almost automati-
cally deportable. The new immigration laws increased the likelihood that an
LPR will face mandatory deportation for any criminal conviction without the
possibility to benefit from executive discretion.92 The 1996 immigration laws
expanded the definition of "aggravated felonies" '93 to encompass the majority
92. Morawetz, supra note 18, at 1937.
93. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 included only murder, drug trafficking, and weapons
trafficking in the aggravated felony category. See Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). In 1990, it was amended to
include money laundering, crimes of violence with a sentence of at least five years, and foreign
convictions with a term of imprisonment completed within the previous fifteen years. See Immigra-
tion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ I 101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). In 1994, it was amended to include several firearms offenses,
monetary transactions from illegally derived funds, theft or burglary with a sentence of at least five
years, alien smuggling for commercial gain, and trafficking in false documents. See Immigration and
Nationality Technical Correction Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997)). In 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) added additional crimes to the list of aggravated felonies (alien
smuggling not for commercial gain, failure to appear for service, obstruction of justice, perjury etc.)
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) added crimes (rape,
sexual abuse of a minor etc.) and lowered the sentencing threshold from five years to one year for,
inter alia, crimes of violence, theft offenses, obstruction of justice and perjury. See AEDPA § 440(e),
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of crimes and misdemeanors.94 This change is especially important to LPRs
with criminal convictions because "aggravated felons" are deportable and
excluded from the possibility of any form of § 240A(a) discretionary relief.
Many scholars have noted that the term, "aggravated felony," is extremely
misleading because a crime does not need to be aggravated or a felony to
satisfy the definition.95
A possible sentence of one year for any "crime of violence" as defined at
18 U.S.C. § 16 makes a crime an aggravated felony.9 6 INA § 101(a)(43)
specifies broad categories of offenses, sometimes by reference to federal
criminal law, but is most often applied to the fifty different states' codes. It is
often difficult to discern what state offenses meet the extremely broad and
general definitions in INA § 101(a)(43). For instance, even though "petty
theft" and "misdemeanor assault and battery" do not appear in INA
§ 101(a)(43), these crimes appear to be included within "theft" in INA
§ 101(a)(43)(G) and "crime of violence" in INA § 101(a)(43)(S) when the
relevant state law allows for a sentence of one year.97 Prior to 1996, many
crimes were not denominated aggravated felonies unless the LPR was
actually sentenced to at least five years.98 A conviction for a simple battery
like a bar fight or for shoplifting with a one-year suspended sentence can now
be deemed an aggravated felony.99
The provisions are even more restrictive for LPRs who are convicted of a
crime within their first five or seven years of lawful entry. Any crime
committed during the first five years of legal residence that could be punished
by a one-year sentence triggers mandatory deportation even if the individual
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. I1 1997); IIRIRA § 321, 8. U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
94. Schuck & Williams, supra note 19, at 397, 450. Case law is unresolved about exactly which
misdemeanors and crimes constitute aggravated felonies. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 1696. For
discussion of the definition of "felony" in 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(B), see In re Yanez-Garcia, 23 1. &
N. Dec. 390 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding that the Board determines whether an offense constitutes an
aggravated felony by reference to decisional authority from the federal circuit court of appeals in
which the case originates); lit re Elgendi, 23 1. & N. Dec. 515 (B.1.A. 2002) (holding that the law of
the convicting jurisdiction is the 'applicable' law in the Second Circuit); Copeland v. Ashcroft, 246 F.
Supp. 2d 183 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that Elgendi was incorrect in interpreting Second Circuit law
which establishes that if a crime is a felony under federal law then it is determined to be an aggravated
felony).
95. Morawetz, supra note 18, at 1939. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 1699 (stating that the
aggravated felony provision "now appears to include a number of crimes that may not seem deserving
of their menacing label, such as petty theft, and misdemeanor assault and battery").
96. See INA §§ 101(a)(43)(F)-(G), 8 U.S.C. §§ I 101(a)(43)(F)-(G) (Supp. 11 1996). Before 1996,
these crimes would only be considered aggravated lelonies if a sentence of at least five years was
actually imposed. See INA §§ 101(a)(43)(F)-(G), 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(43)(F)-(G) (1994) (amended
1996).
97. See INA §§ 101(a)(43)(F)-(G), (S), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F)-(G), (S) (Supp- In 1997). See
generally Bennett, supra note 3.
98. 8 U.S.C. §§ I l101(a)(43)(F)-(G).
99. See Philip S. Anderson, Editorial, Immigration Reform Unfairly Includes Petty Offenses,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 9, 1999 (reporting that mother of two was ordered deported because she was
convicted six years earlier of shoplifting baby outfits worth $14.99); Morawetz, supra note 18, at
1939.
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receives only probation or a fine.' 00 Before 1996, a single crime involving
moral turpitude within five years of entry was not a ground of deportability
for this group of LPRs unless the individual was actually sentenced to at least
one year of incarceration.' °' After 1996, in New York, a person could receive
mandatory deportation for such offenses as jumping a turnstile or using
unauthorized cable service. 10 2 Furthermore, a lawful permanent resident who
has been convicted of simple possession of marijuana will receive mandatory
deportation if the crime is committed within the first five years of residence
as an LPR.'
0 3
2. Elimination of INA § 244 and INA § 212(c) and Decreased Executive
Discretion
Immigration measures became more restrictive due to a severe reduction
in LPRs' access to executive discretionary relief from deportation. In 1996,
cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a) repealed § 244(a) and § 212(c)
entirely. 10 4 The 1996 immigration laws arguably decreased executive discre-
tion even further than the original INA of 1952 by tightening the standards on
hardship and increasing residency requirements.
The 1996 immigration laws repealed INA § 244(a) in its entirety and
replaced it with § 240(A)(a). The 1996 immigration laws mandated that
hardship to the individual is no longer relevant to the review.' 0 5 Since
§ 244(a) relief has always had very limited application, the loss of § 212(c)
relief was more devastating to LPRs with criminal convictions. Unlike
§ 212(c) the new law requires that the LPR is lawfully admitted for
permanent residence for no less than five years and has resided in the United
States continuously for seven years after having been admitted in any status.
Section 240A(a) relief is not available for an LPR who has been convicted of
an aggravated felony regardless of the time served. Unlike under the
pre-1996 law, the period of continuous residence ends when the INS serves a
100. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(1); Morawetz, supra note 18, at 1941.
101. INA§241(a)(2)(I).
102. Morawetz, supra note 18, at 1941; Schuck & Williams, supra note 19,388 (citing discussion
in Yesil v. Reno, 973 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y 1997), aff'd sub nom. Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106
(2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Reno v. Navas, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999)).
103. See INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(2000).
104. IIRIRA § 304, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1997). LPRs that are deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)
and § 237(a)(3) cannot benefit from this form of relief. These two provisions cover LPRs who have
committed crimes of moral turpitude within five years (or ten years in the case of an alien provided
lawful permanent resident status under § 1255(j)) after the date of admission, and are convicted of a
crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. An LPR who committed an
aggravated felony at any time after admission is not eligible. An LPR who is convicted of a violation
of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation relating to a controlled substance,
other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of thirty grams or less of
marijuana, is deportable. Any immigrant who is, or at any time after admission has been, a drug
abuser or addict is deportable. Failure to register, document fraud, and falsification of documents also
render an LPR ineligible for this form of relief. Id.; see INA § 237(a)(2)-(a)(3).
105. See IIRIRA § 304 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1250(2)).
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notice to appear or when the person commits a crime that makes the person
deportable. The court had previously counted the time from the commence-
ment of the immigration proceeds through a non-frivolous appeal to fulfill
the seven-year requirement.'
0 6
The 1996 immigration laws expanded the definition of aggravated felony, '
07
lowered the length of a sentence required to trigger mandatory deporta-
tion,'0 8 and shut off all forms of relief (except for withholding of removal and
relief under the torture convention) from deportation for almost all LPRs
with criminal convictions.' 0 9 Along with these restrictive measures came a
severe reduction in judicial review." 0 Unlike the period before the 1996
immigration laws, however, private bills have not increased as a response to
restrictive immigration measures.
B. Private Bills Post-1996
Because of the restrictive nature of the 1996 immigration laws, some
commentators have wondered if private bills would increase as a way to
provide legislative discretion to the higher numbers of deportable LPRs. As
Professor Aleinikoff stated in the immediate aftermath of IIRIRA's passage,
"It remains to be seen what impact the recent restrictions on relief from
deportation and judicial review will have on the number of private bills
introduced and enacted each year.""' Private bills may find "new life in
compelling hardship cases now that other, more traditional, defenses to
removal have been eliminated or restricted to near extinction by the 1996
immigration laws."'"12 The historical relationship described in Section II
suggests that the increase in restrictive immigration measures would be
followed by an increase in access to legislative discretion through private
bills. Despite this historical pattern, since 1996, the number of private bills
introduced on behalf of LPRs with criminal convictions has not increased. "
3
106. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that a final administrative order of exclusion
or deportation was necessary to end an immigrant's lawful unrelinquished domicile. See In re Duarte,
18 I. & N. Dec. 329 (B.I.A. 1982). However, some circuit courts of appeals have held that an
immigrant's lawful unrelinquished domicile continues if she files a non-frivolous appeal of her
deportation order. See, e.g., Torres-Hernandez v. INS, 812 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1987).
107. See AEDPA § 440(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); IIRIRA § 321, 8.
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
108. See AEDPA § 435(a).
109. See AEDPA § 440(d); IIRIRA § 304.
110. IIRIRA bars judicial review of most removal orders. Schuck & Williams, supra note 19, at
371. The extent of judicial review, however, is highly contested. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289 (2001).
111. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 5, at 788. See generally Hooper & Osuna, supra note 6,
at 3.
112. Hooper & Osuna, supra note 6, at 2. For the potential increased use of private bills see B.
John Ovink, Why a Plea Bargain May No Longer Be a Bargain for Legal Permanent Resident Aliens,
46 FED. LAW 49, 53 (1999).
113. This is confirmed by the author's review of all private legislation introduced between
1996-2003. U.S. House Immigration Subcommittee Staff also confirms this observation. Telephone
Interview with anonymous member of U.S. House Immigration Subcommittee Staff (Feb. 28, 2003).
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In fact, Congress has only enacted one private bill that involved a lawful
permanent resident with a criminal conviction.'14
1. The Rhetorical Increase in Access to Private Bill Relief?
Even though private bills have not been increasingly introduced or passed
since 1996, Congress has rhetorically acknowledged that individuals should
increasingly use the private bill process as a surrogate for reduced executive
discretion. During the mark-up session of proposed legislation to grant the
Attorney General increased discretion, Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX),
one of the most vocal and powerful architects of the 1996 immigration laws,
stated, "The genuine hardship cases need to be addressed."' 15 Rep. Smith and
other Members of Congress stated, however, that the Immigration Subcom-
mittee, rather than the Attorney General, is better suited to deal with
deportation cases through private immigration bills. 16 Six dissenting Mem-
bers to the proposed legislation jointly wrote:
If there are true 'hardship' cases, they should be addressed. But they
should follow the regular order and be reviewed by the Immigration
Subcommittee [through private bills]. They should not be piled up on
the Attorney General." 17
The sponsor of the bill, Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), responded
to Rep. Smith's proposal to deal with hardship cases through private bills by
stating that:
[Tihe gentleman is right, these should be case-by-case. But I do think
letting the Attorney General do it is a better way, since he acknowledges
there are cases where it should happen, than doing it by a private bill.
And what this Committee began to do years ago was to say, a private
bill that is unique, we will deal with it. But where there appears a class
of cases, it is better to deal with it through legislation. So I do not think
the existence of the private bill remedy is a real relief. In fact, the
gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum, had tried to do that, and that's
what led the then-Chairman of the Committee, the gentleman from
Illinois, to say, let's do a [public] bill. it8
114. Priv. L. No. 105-6, 112 Stat. 3666 (1998); see Statutes at Large (private legislation)
1996-2003.
115. H.R. REP. No. 107-785 (2002).
116. Smith stated, "[Tjhe genuine hardship cases need to be addressed, but they should be
considered under regular order by the Immigration Committee, and that's why we need to oppose this
amendment in the nature of a substitute." Smith further stated, "if there are genuine hardship cases
.. it's the Immigration Committee that should take care of them, not the Attorney General." H.R.
REP. No. 107-785 (2002).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Despite this rhetorical commitment to loosening restrictive immigration
measures through providing access to the private bill process, however,
Congress has not increasingly introduced or passed private bills subsequent
to the 1996 immigration laws. This interruption in the historical relationship
has decreased the discretionary and informational role of private bills.
III. WHAT EXPLAINS THE DISRUPTION IN THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP?
In 1998, the Congressional Research Service stated that the sharp decline
in private bills was a result of expanded agency discretion "to deal with many
of the situations that tended to give rise to private bills." " 9 Section IIC of this
Article illustrated that during the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's expanded
agency discretion may have contributed to the decrease in the number of
private bills. 12 0 As executive discretion expanded, the need for private bills
decreased. As Section III illustrated, however, expanded executive discretion
cannot explain why private bills have not increased following the enactment
of the 1996 immigration laws. Rather than increase, executive discretion
vis-A-vis LPRs with criminal convictions has decreased sharply. This section
will explore alternative explanations for the interruption in the historical
relationship that is hindering private bills from playing their historical
discretionary and informative role.
A. Tightening the Standards: "Precedents" and Hardship
1 21
The changes in the rules122 and practices related to precedents and
hardship can help explain the interruption in the historical relationship.1
23
These changes, which represent the major changes to the rules and proce-
dures since 1954, have further decreased the transparency and viability of the
private bill process. The changes tightened "the rules regarding the hardship
119. Richard S. Beth, Private Bills: Procedure in the House, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (1998),
available at http://www.house.gov/rules/98-628.htm.
120. The Chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee stated in 1971 that private bills were not a
panacea for all cases, particularly where administrative relief may be available- 117 CONG. REC.
10,143 (1971).
121. Currently, private bills can only be introduced in Congress once the private bill applicant
exhausts all judicial and administrative remedies. The first step for a private bill applicant is to
persuade a Member of the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives to author the bill. If the Senator or
Representative agrees to author and introduce the bill, the bill is referred to the appropriate
subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the house of Congress in which it is introduced. After
referral, the subcommittee may decide to table the private bill with no further action. In its discretion,
the subcommittee may schedule a hearing on the private bill and hear testimony. If approved by the
subcommittee, the private bill is referred to the full Judiciary Committee for a vote. If the vote is
favorable, the private bill is sent to the floor for a vote. The private bill undergoes this process in each
house of Congress. If both the House and the Senate vote in favor of the private bill, the President will
then decide whether to sign the bill into law. See Hooper & Osuna, supra note 6, at 2.
122. There are two primary sets of rules that govern the private bill process: the rules of the
Judiciary Committee's Immigration Subcommittee of each house of Congress and the rules of each
house relating to debate on legislation by all Members of Congress.
123. This section focuses exclusively on the experience of the House of Representatives, as the
Senate followed the House lead. See MAGOUIRE, supra note 3.
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criteria necessary for the Committee's consideration of bills as well as the
guidelines on precedents to which the Committee would adhere." 1
24
1. "Precedents"
The introduction of the use of "precedents" since the early 1980s is
hindering the historical relationship between private bills and immigration
law as it reduces the likelihood of a private bill's introduction and passage. 1
25
Precedents can determine the fate of a private bill as they "can help or hinder
a case, can guide a bill through Congress, or kill it upon introduction."' 26 The
Congressional Research Service in 1998 stated that it is current practice for a
panel to decline to report a private bill if its records show few precedents for
favorable House action on bills dealing with similar conditions.' 27 The word
"precedent," however, is misleading because the Immigration Subcommittee
picks and chooses which precedents it will look more favorably upon. 128 In
other words, successful private bills in the past cannot be persuasively used
as precedents unless there is Congressional will to do so.
Private bills related to immigrants with criminal convictions illustrate the
highly political and selective nature of "precedent." Even though there have
been successful private bills related to immigrants with criminal convictions,
Immigration Subcommittee staff confirm that virtually all private bills
related to criminal convictions are rejected because of a lack of precedent. 129
Historically there have been several kinds of private bills related to criminal
convictions that have received favorable treatment. From 1789 to 1997, of
the private bills related to criminal convictions, "712 (74%) involved moral
124. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 28.
125. Until the late 1970s, the Immigration Subcommittees did not expressly use precedent as a
way to limit access to the private bill process. In the early 1980s, the Immigration Subcommittees
published rules relating to precedents through "Dear Colleague" letters to members of the House or
Senate. During the 1981-1982 Congress, a letter from the House Immigration Subcommittee stated
that the role of precedents is an important factor "because a decision on one private bill" could "set a
precedent for thousands." 127 CONG. REC_ 17,036 (1981). This is one of the first occasions that the
House Immigration Subcommittee circulated its policies through Dear Colleague letters. MAGUIRE,
supra note 3, at 34. In the 98th Congress (1983-1984), another notice was inserted into the
Congressional Record stating, "it is the policy of the Subcommittee generally to act favorable on only
those private bills which meet certain precedents." 129 CONG. REC. 3701 (1983). See generally HOuSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TtI CONG.. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND STATEMENT OF POLICY (PRIVATE
LEGISLATION), (Comm. Print 1984). House Immigration Subcommittee Chairman Romano L. Mazzoli
(D-KY) stated in a letter to House Members in 1983, "while the Subcommittee is not bound by
precedent ... it rarely deviates from precedent when handling private immigration bills." 129 CONG.
REC. 3702 (1983). To further reinforce the need to adhere to precedents, the House Subcommittee
amended its Rules of Procedure in 1985-86 to require a two-thirds favorable vote to even schedule a
bill in certain categories. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND STATEMENT OF POLICY (PRIVATE LEGISLATION), (Comm. Print 1986).
126. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 4.
127. The panel "makes available to Member offices information on what documentation it
requires and the kinds of bills on which it is likely to take favorable action," Beth, supra note 119,
available at http://www.house.gov/rules/98-628.htm.
128. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 33.
129. Telephone Interview with anonymous member of U.S. House Immigration Subcommittee
Staff (Feb. 28, 2003).
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turpitude and other related crimes, 66 (7%) involved drugs, 186 (19%)
involved fraud, and 18 (2%) involved smuggling.' ' 30 Private bill cases in the
past have granted relief for individuals with convictions related to, among
other things, theft, fraud, assault, prostitution, illegal entry, aiding and
abetting illegal entry and drug possession. ' 3' Even though there is historical
precedent related to immigrants with criminal convictions, however, the
House Subcommittee in recent years has only referred to very recent
precedent in its evaluation of private bill cases.'
32
The current use of "precedent," therefore, makes it difficult for groups like
LPRs with criminal convictions to receive private bill relief even when there
is historical precedent in their favor.' 33 Congress, however, in rare, politically
important cases, does look exhaustively at historical precedent. In the case of
Elian Gonzdlez, Members of Congress who supported the private bill poured
through historical private bill cases to find favorable precedent. 34
2. Hardship
Similar to the use of precedent, Congress has reduced access to private
bills through its increasingly strict use of the definition and interpretation of
hardship. This change hinders the historical relationship because it makes it
even more difficult to introduce or pass a private bill.
Congress has increasingly tightened the definition of hardship. In the
1950s, 135 1960s and most of the 1970s, the rules created a two-tiered
standard for the definition of hardship. In the 1950s, those who entered the
U.S. as "stowaways, or deserting seamen, or by surreptitiously entering
without inspection through the land or sea borders of the United States"
needed to show "extreme hardship" to receive consideration for a private
130. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 149.
131. Priv. L. No. 321, 71 Stat. A126 (1957); Priv. L. No. 183, 65 Stat. A70 (1951); Priv. L. No.
730, 64 Stat. A142 (1950); Priv. L. No. 810, 52 Stat. 1434 (1938); Priv. L. No. 620, 52 Stat. 1355
(1938); S. REP. No. 794 (1957); H.R. REP. No. 1250 (1957); S. REP. No. 523 (1951); H.R. REP. No.
474 (1951); S. REP. No. 1397 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 2614 (1950); S. REP. No. 2213 (1938); S. REP.
No. 2026 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 2055 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 2040 (1938).
132. Telephone Interview with anonymous member of U.S. House Immigration Subcommittee
Staff (Feb. 28, 2003).
133. Id. See 131 CONG. REc. 11,682 (1985).
134. See Margaret Mikyung Lee, Private Bills for Citizenship or Permanent Residency: A Brief
Overview, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESs 2 (2000) (discussing efforts related to a private bill for Elian
GonzAlez); Karen DeYoung, Rare Act of Congress is Planned for Elian; GOP Leaders Back
Citizenship Bills, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2000, at A3 (describing congressional efforts to pass private
bill to naturalize or grant permanent residency to Elian Gonzdlez).
135. There were some major changes to the rules in 1954 to reduce the number of private bill
requests aimed at obtaining stays of deportation. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 27. The Subcommittee no
longer reconsidered cases unless some of the facts changed substantially. 100 CONG. REC. 610 (1954).
"The Subcommittee would no longer request a report from the Attorney General, thus staying
deportation, on behalf of immigrants who entered the United States as 'stowaways, or deserting
seamen, or by surreptitiously entering without inspection through land or sea border of the United
States' unless the Subcommittee found that the purpose of the private bills involved 'uniting or
preventing separation of families.' This became Subcommittee Rule 4 which was altered later to use
the word hardship." MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 27.
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bill. 136 This category was meant to make it more difficult for beneficiaries
with no legal status. 137 The individuals that did not fall into this category
were required to satisfy the less strict, but vaguely defined, "hardship"
standard. 138 In 1971, the rules were amended to state that all non-immigrants
(aliens entering the United States on any temporary visa) needed to show
"extreme hardship."
In 1983 Congress tightened the rules and began to apply the "extreme
hardship" standard to all private bill applicants (including LPRs). 139 More-
over, in the 1980's the Subcommittee stated that it would only support private
bills that have "extraordinary merit" and pose "heavy hardship."' 4 o In 1987,
the Subcommittee stated that private bills are:
An extraordinary remedy available only to assist aliens with unusual
problems and where extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or permanent
resident alien can be demonstrated ... the subcommittee interprets very
narrowly the criteria for hardship.1
41
An increasingly narrow interpretation, as well as the black letter definition
of who must show "extreme hardship," has contributed to the decrease in the
use of private bills. The current House Subcommittee's rules caution poten-
tial private bill petitioners about the rigid hardship standard for private bills.
The Subcommittee reviews "only those cases it finds are of such an
extraordinary nature that an exception to the law is needed."' 4 2 A Staff
member of the House Subcommittee on Immigration confirmed that to meet
the hardship standard there needs to be an unbelievably egregious mistake on
the part of the government or a grave health or safety risk to a family
member. 14
3
The interpretation of the hardship criteria, however, has not always been so
narrow. Before the late 1970s, family separations played a more substantial
role in hardship determinations for excludable or deportable immigrants with
136. 103 CONG. REC. 2249 (1957). The author of the bill also had to provide the subcommittee
with documentary evidence in support of the request to waive this rule. Id. In 1969 this list was
amended to include visitors, exchange visitors and students within the purview of this rule. 115 CONG.
REC. 6075 (1969) (statement of Rep. Feighan).
137. 113 CONG. REC. 14,049 (1987).
138. 103 CONG. REC. 2249 (1957).
139. See MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at Appendix A. 131 CONG. REC. 11,682 (1985); cf 117 CONG.
REC. 10,142 (1971) (interpreting the standard for private bills as a remedy for aliens with "unusual
problems resulting in unusual hardship").
140. 131 CONG. REC. 11,682 (1985).
141. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., RULES OF PROCEDURE AND STATEMENT OF
POLICY (PRIVATE LEGISLATION), (Comm. Print 1987).
142. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 106TH CONG., RULES OF PROCEDURE AND STATEMENT OF
POLICY (PRIVATE LEGISLATION), (Comm. Print 2000).
143. Telephone Interview with anonymous member of U.S. House Immigration Subcommittee
Staff (Feb. 28, 2003).
2004]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
criminal convictions."44 In 1938, for instance, the House Committee can-
celled Gordon Cheasley's deportation, stating, "because of his wife, children,
and position, it would be unjust hardship to deport him."' 45 In 1950, the
Committee's report stated that Augusto Pereira's deportation would cause
hardship because he "reared seven stepchildren ... has the reputation of
being a good workman, a good family man, hard working, and a good
provider, devoted to his wife and stepchildren."'' 46 The House Committee
granted Mrs. Maryanna Boppel relief in 1951 through a private bill, noting
that "she has effected a complete reformation and rehabilitation and . .. her
deportation would seriously affect her foster children and her [U.S. citizen]
husband."' 147 In Fernando Alves Macos' case in 1976, the House Committee
noted, "the [private] bill should be approved solely on the basis of hardship
which is being caused to the beneficiary's second wife and child."
1 48
Private bill cases related to immigrants with criminal convictions since the
1980s, however, illustrate the narrow interpretation of hardship and consider-
ation of family separation only in very extreme, life threatening, cases. Oscar
Salas-Veldzquez, for example, was deportable due to his involvement in
marriage fraud in 1985. When the INS began actively pursuing deportation
proceedings against Mr. Salaz-Velizquez, he had a U.S. citizen spouse and
child. Congress granted Mr. Salas-Velazquez relief through a private bill
because both his wife and child had serious life threatening diseases that
required treatment in the U.S. Congress noted that their lives would be in
severe danger if they were forced to live in Mexico. 149 The only other private
bill for an immigrant with a criminal conviction that has passed since 1988
also illustrates the extreme situations that constitute hardship. The bill was on
behalf of Larry Pieterse who was convicted of possession of drug parapherna-
lia. In 1991, after thorough investigation of the case by Parole Board
investigators, the State of Florida granted Mr. Pieterse a full pardon.
However, even though he had received a waiver the laws required Mr.
Pieterse's deportation because the state pardon did not prevent a drug
conviction from being utilized for deportation purposes. The private bill
granted Mr. Pieterse a waiver from deportation.150
Family members of deportable LPRs have also felt the consequences of
144. See Priv. L. No. 810, 52 Stat. 1434 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 2055 (1938); Priv. L. No. 321, 71
Stat. A126 (1957); S. REP. No, 794 (1957); HR. REP. No. 1250 (1957) (noting that Refugio
Guerrero-Monje's deportation would cause hardship as he was the "sole support of his family and
were he required to depart from the United States, it is stated that they would suffer severe economic
hardship."); Priv. L. No. 100, 86 Stat. 1541 (1972), H.R. REP. No. 827 (1972); S. REP. No. 884
(1972).
145. Priv. L. No. 620, 52 Stat. 1355 (1938); S. REP. No. 2026 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 2040 (1938).
146. Priv. L. No. 730, 64 Stat. A 142 (1950); S. REP. No. 1397 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 2614 (1950).
147. Priv. L. No. 183, 65 Stat. A70 (1951); S. REP. No. 523 (1951); H.R. REP. No. 474 (1951).
148. Priv. L. No. 121, 90 Stat. 3004 (1976); S. REP. No. 1291 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 907 (1976).
149. Priv. L. No. 104-3, 110 Stat. 4287 (1996).
150. Florida granted Pieterse a pardon, in part, based on evidence that his wife had planted the
drugs. Priv. L. No. 105-6, 112 Stat. 3666 (1998); H.R. REP. No. 105-644 (1998).
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the narrowing of the hardship standard. Family members of potential private
bill beneficiaries report that they are frequently told by Members of Congress
that their case does not meet the extremely strict hardship requirement. 15
Deborah Aaron's story is very typical. Ms. Aaron came to the United States
from Britain and had been married to a U.S. citizen for twenty-two years. In
1999, Ms. Aaron faced deportation and separation from her family because at
the age of twenty she had been fined about sixteen dollars for a minor drug
violation. Ms. Aaron tried to get Congress to introduce a private bill on her
behalf. "They [Members of Congress] responded with sympathy but said
they could not do so when drugs were involved." 152 Immigration Subcommit-
tee Staff confirm that difficult hardship standards stand in the way of the
introduction and passage of private bills today and provide members of
Congress with an easy excuse. 153
Congress has gone so far with its strict interpretation of hardship that even
the most sympathetic of cases that do not involve criminal convictions are
not successful. 15 4 The case of Deena Gilbey illustrates the impossible odds
that a private bill candidate faces as she challenges deportation. Deena
Gilbey's U.S. citizen husband died at the World Trade Center on September
11, 2001. Prior to her husband's death, Ms. Gilbey lived in the U.S. with her
husband and their two U.S. citizen sons for over ten years. When Ms. Gilbey
contacted the INS shortly after September 11 to ask what paperwork she
would need to allow her to visit her family in England, the INS notified her
that she would soon be deported because her U.S. citizen husband had died.
Senators Jon Corzine and Robert Torricelli introduced a private bill on Ms.
Gilbey's behalf. The private bill died, she was told, "because her case was not
serious enough."'
155
This hardship standard, however, has been loosened at times on behalf of
high profile applicants. In 1987, for instance, Congress passed a private bill
for the stepson of Senator John Warner (R-VA) and the natural son of his
spouse, actress Elizabeth Taylor. The bill waived exclusion based on a
conviction of possession of 13.6 milligrams of cannabis. 
156
151. Letter from anonymous member of Citizens and Immigrants for Equal Justice to the author
(Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with author); Interviews with anonymous members of Citizens and Immigrants
for Equal Justice, in Wash. D.C. (Jan. 14, 2003).
152. Anthony Lewis, Random Cruelties of 1996 Immigration Law, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 2,
1999, at A23.
153. Id.; Telephone Interview with anonymous member of U.S. House Immigration Subcommit
tee Staff (Feb. 28, 2003).
154. See Michael Riley, Campbell Bill Backs Apodaca: Senator's Measure Would Make Student
Permanent Resident, DENVER POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at A-01; Bryan Mitchell, Accident's Victims Still
Suffering After Effects, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 25, 2002 (quoting Rep. John J. Duncan Jr.,
R-TN who stated that "Congress almost never passes a private bill ... [it has to be unbelievably
incredible circumstances").
155. Kristen A. Graham, 9/11 Widow's Plight Stirs S. Jersey Aid: Gloucester City Reaches Out tb
Woman Facing Deportation, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 7, 2002.
156. Priv. L. No. 100-36, 102 Stat. 4859 (1988). See MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 178-79.
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3. "Official Objectors" and Requirement to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies
The introduction and continued use of Official Objectors also reduces
access to private bills and allows political, rather than equitable, concerns to
almost entirely dominate the process. In 1932, Official Objectors were
introduced to screen private bills after they pass through the Judiciary
Committee. 157 The Majority Leader and the Minority Leader each appoint
three members to serve as Private Calendar Official Objectors during a
Congress. 15" The Official Objectors are responsible for scrutinizing all bills
on the Private Calendar and objecting to those that they deem inappropri-
ate.' 59 Subsequent to this change if two members of the House oppose the bill
it is automatically recommitted to the Judiciary Committee. Official Objec-
tors can recommit a bill before it even reaches the floor for a vote.
Before 1995, the rules stated that Objectors are on the floor "ready to
object to any bill which does not adhere to the guidelines established on the
Private Calendar."' 160 The current rules allow for even more unfettered
discretion. The rules currently state that when the private calendar is called,
the objectors are on the floor ready "to object to any Private Bill which they
feel objectionable for any reason." 161 Official Objectors are not obligated to
announce the specific criteria they are using to object to private bills.162
The introduction in 1954 of the requirement that "all administrative
avenues" be pursued prior to Subcommittee action also reduced access to
private bills. 163 In 1979 the Committee noted that bills where administrative
relief existed would not be favorably reported unless compelling circum-
stances existed.' 64 The current rules are even more restrictive as they state
that a private bill cannot be scheduled for Subcommittee action until all
administrative and judicial remedies are exhausted. Because it is not clear
when judicial and administrative remedies are exhausted, this rule makes it
difficult for potential private bill petitioners to know when it is appropriate to
pursue a bill. Moreover, Members of Congress often use this requirement to
dissuade individuals from pursuing private bills, leading individuals to
157. 75 CONG. RFc. 8812 (1932).
158. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Rule XV
(2003).
159. "In practice, instead of objecting, [Official] Objectors will sometimes ask that a bill be
passed over, without prejudice,' thereby giving sponsors an opportunity to discuss concerns with
them informally before the next calendar call." Beth, supra note 119, available at http://
www.house.gov/rules/98-628.htm.
160. 139 CoNG. REC. H5666 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1993) (outlining the Private Calendar Agreement).
161. 147 CONG. REC. H1417-18, (daily ed July 24, 2001) (statement of Hon. Howard Coble).
This language was introduced in the 1995-1996 Congress.
162. See A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House, House Practice, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 15 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash. D.C. 2003).
163. 100 CONG. REC. 610 (1954).
164. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 31.
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believe that one can only pursue a private bill the day before deportation. 65
B. The Politics of Private Bills
Even though politics have always influenced private bills, 166 politics
increasingly hindered the use of private bills since the early 1980s. Members
of Congress have gradually become unwilling to introduce and advocate for
the passage of private bills.
Some Members of Congress complain that private bills take too much time
for too little pay off. 167 As Senator Paul Wellstone's press secretary stated,
"[a]s a matter of policy, we don't do [private bills]." 168 In the past, Members
of Congress have used private bills as a vehicle for support from particular
constituencies. 169 Today, however, many Members of Congress consider the
potential dangers to outweigh the potential benefits. Although private bills
can galvanize support from a particular constituency, they can also be
politically costly.' 70 In 1999, one of the main proponents of the 1996
immigration laws, Bill McCollum (R-FL), was severely criticized for intro-
ducing a private bill on behalf of the son of a Republican party official. 171
The scandals surrounding private bills are used as one of the most common
explanations for the recent lack of Congressional willingness to introduce
private bills.' 72 Representative Joe Wilson (R-SC) summed it up, saying,
165. Letter from anonymous member of Citizens and Immigrants for Equal Justice to the author
(Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with author).
166. Private bills depend on the strength and willingness of certain members of Congress. The
political weight and effort of the sponsor of the private bill will determine its fate. Sidney B. Rawitz,
In the Hands of Congress: Suspension of Deportation and Private Bills, 57 INTERPRETER REL. 76, 82
(Feb. 14, 1980); Lauren Markoe, Student Weighs Options to Avoid Deportation, STATE, Sept. 29,
2002, available at 2002 WL 233326612 (stating that "[Rep] Wilson [R-SC] believes the Senate bill
has a better chance of helping the family than a House bill. Because it's sponsored by Thurmond, and
because he is leaving the Senate after a record forty eight years, his colleagues might be more likely
to grant his wishes.")
167. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 11.
168. Doug Grow, We're About to Deport One Fine Human Being; Let's Hope Nyonzele Won't Be
in Peril When U.S. Sends Him Back to Congo, STAR TRIBUNE, June 23, 2002, at 2B.
169. See generally Bailey & Samuel, CONGRESS AT WORK 160-61 (1952)
170. Michael Riley & Mike Soraghan, Support Grows for Student; Owens Speaks to Bush on
Apodaca's Behalf, DENVER POST, Sept. 29, 2002, at A-01 (stating that a private bill on behalf of
Aurora Central High graduate is an "example of the effect of laws preventing illegal immigrants from
getting in-state tuition." U.S. Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-CO) contacted the Denver office of the INS and
asked the agency to deport Apodaca after reading about the student in the Denver Post. Political
analysts say that initial Republican support for the lawmaker has "eroded under a growing sense that
the case is damaging the party politically ... [t~he bill 'carries a lot of symbolic weight,' said Floyd
Ciruli, a political strategist in Denver. 'It shows compassion and that the party is interested in issues
important to Hispanics' ").
171. Tamara Lytle, McCullum Wants to Help Some Aliens Stay in the U.S., ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Sept. 28, 1999, at AS; Michael Griffin and Shawn Holton, McCollum Defends Efforts to Reverse
Felon's Deportation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 19, 1999, at CI (describing controversy over private
bill introduced by Rep. Bill McCollum (R-FL), a sponsor of the 1996 immigration laws, to benefit
deported son of Republican Party official from McCollum's district).
172. See Rawitz, supra note 166, at 80 (arguing that the amount of private bills declined sharply
"attributable less to noble legislative motivations that to a perceived need to take cover as an aroma of
scandal enveloped the process").
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"private bills, because members of Congress from both parties had abused
the privilege of filing them in the past, are generally considered with
skepticism by Judiciary Committee members." 1
73
There have been three major controversies surrounding private bills that
have fueled unwillingness on the part of members of Congress. In 1952,
some Members of Congress were investigated for introducing bills on behalf
of illegal immigrants. The New York Herald Tribune noted that Members of
Congress admitted introducing a large number of bills "without hope of
obtaining favorable action because of pressure from groups in their home
districts or states."'174 In the 1970s, Members of Congress came under
scrutiny for improprieties related to introducing private bills for Chinese
shipjumpers. 175 One of the most high profile scandals occurred in 1980. In an
FBI "sting" operation (ABSCAM), seven Members of Congress were found
guilty of receiving bribes to introduce private bills. 176 For the first time since
1861, a Member of Congress was expelled because of his participation in the
ABSCAM scandal. 77 Scandalsled to the further decline in Congressional
willingness to introduce private bills.'7 8
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the pre-1996 period, increases in private bills as a response to restrictive
immigration legislation informed Congress about the inadequacies of exist-
ing laws. The historical relationship between restrictive immigration law and
private bills, however, has not continued after the 1996 changes. Some have
mentioned that the harsh elements of the 1996 immigration laws need to be
brought to the attention of members of Congress, "and private bills are one
way of sending that message." 179 Actions by immigrants, immigrant advo-
cates and members of Congress may allow private bills to once again play
this informational role.
Immigrants and immigrant advocates may be able to play an important
role in revitalizing the historical relationship between restrictive immigration
law and private bills. Advocates for deportable immigrants are often over-
worked and feel that expending limited resources on the private bill effort is
173. See Markoe, supra note 166.
174. World Racket Smuggles Aliens into U.S. @ $100-$1,500 Apiece, N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, May
25, 1952, at 1, 24; LangerDefends Private Bills toAidAliens Illegally in U.S., N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE,
May 26, 1952, at 8; World Ring Forging Passports Helps Smuggle Aliens into U.S., N. Y. HERALD
TRIBUNE, May 27, 1952, at 14.
175. SeeS. REP. No. 911 (1970).
176. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 227, 230; 126 CONG. REC. 28,966 (1980). For cases related to the
corruption see Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477
(1979).
177. MAGUIRE, supra note 3, at 227, 230; 126 CONG. REc. 28,966 (1980)_
178. Lee, supra note 134, at 3.
179. Hooper & Osuna, supra note 6.
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not worth the cost.'8 ° This article suggests, however, that private bills have
the potential to be a powerful form of advocacy as they inform Congress
about the need to reform restrictive immigration legislation, such as the 1996
immigration laws and the laws enacted in the wake of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks. Immigrants and immigrant advocates could help
restore the historical role of private bills by working together to convince
members of Congress to introduce private bills and by lobbying for reform of
the rules and procedures related to private bills.
Members of Congress should change the rules and procedures related to
private bills. Changes in the rules may go a long way in signaling Congres-
sional willingness, expressed by Lamar Smith, to use the private bill process
to deal with hardship cases arising from the 1996 immigration laws. The
current rules and practices (especially the use of precedents, the interpreta-
tion of hardship and Congressional unwillingness) are impeding private bills
from playing their historical informational role. This conclusion describes
some specific changes that should be considered, but this is not an exhaustive
list.
Private bills may increase if all historical private bill cases could be used as
persuasive precedent and if Congress was obliged to provide an explanation
when it diverges from historical precedent. Moreover, the Immigration
Subcommittee should be obliged to more specifically define its use (or lack
of use) of precedents. In other words, since the current use of precedent does
not comport with the traditional legal definition of precedent, the Immigra-
tion Subcommittee should provide a definition of "precedent."
The "extreme hardship" requirement should be returned to a "hardship"
requirement to signal to potential private bill petitioners that private bills are
not forms of relief, with limited applicability only when a family member is
gravely ill. As our immigration law has historically endeavored to keep
families together, 8 ' members of Congress should re-institute the primacy of
family relationships in its determinations of hardship.
Other reforms could signal a change in the perception of private bills,
including a requirement that Official Objectors announce the criteria they use
in evaluating a private bill, particularly when the Objectors reject a private
bill. Furthermore, the requirement that all administrative and judicial av-
enues have been exhausted should be altered to more explicitly allow the
introduction of private bills earlier in the process. Because it is so difficult to
determine when all avenues have been exhausted, members of Congress are
180. Interviews with anonymous members of Citizens and Immigrants for Equal Justice, in Wash.
D.C. (Jan. 14, 2003). Some organizations have started to consider the utility of private bills as
advocacy tools. E.g., The Urban Justice Center, Citizens and Immigrants for Equal Justice.
181. See generally Peggy Cooper Davis, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES (1997) (discussing constitutional jurisprudence protecting family interests); Morawetz, supra
note 18, at 1951 (stating that the immigration system reflects the law's assumption that family unity is
an important value); COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY U.S. SENATE, supra note 43, at 5.
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able to use this to shield themselves from private bill petitioners. A more
specific and flexible statement about the exhaustion of remedies would help
to de-politicize the process and increase transparency.
If Congress truly regards its private lawmaking function as "an essential
part" of dispensing justice, it needs to modify the private bill process to once
again provide immigrant groups with meaningful, rather than rhetorical,
access.' 82 These proposed changes, along with others, would foster the
continued relationship between immigration law and private bills, allowing
private bills to fulfill their historical informational role and help to "perfect"
the 1996 immigration laws and their progeny.
182. Private Bills in Congress, supra note 2, at 1684-88.
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